Trump’s Russian diesel deal has run into a 2022 law that only peace can lift

The first tanker sent to the United States under Donald Trump’s diesel deal with Vladimir Putin has not docked. The Malta-flagged Agioi Fanendes, carrying about 40,000 tonnes of Russian ultra-low-sulphur diesel loaded at the Baltic port of Primorsk in late October, was reported drifting in the Atlantic off the US east coast from 9 November, broadcasting that it was “awaiting orders”, according to tracking data cited by Reuters and Maritime Executive. Its Greek manager, Eastmed, told Reuters on Tuesday that no port of discharge had been nominated.

Update, 11 November: Bloomberg, citing port reports and vessel-tracking data, reported that the Agioi Fanendes turned around about 400 nautical miles off New York and has been moving slowly away from the US east coast since 9 November. Kpler, cited by the Wall Street Journal, now lists the tanker’s destination as South America; AIS data compiled by TankerMap as of 01:03 UTC on 11 November showed the ship still in the North Atlantic, making about one knot, and broadcasting Alanya as its destination. The Russian-flagged Talisman has reached Egypt: AIS records compiled by MaritimeOptima show it at anchor off Alexandria since 9 November, and Kpler, cited by the same Journal report, also said a diverted tanker in the trade has arrived there.

Asked whether the ship had been turned away, Chris Wright, the US energy secretary, said he had no worries. “It’ll go to another port,” he told Reuters. “We just want that diesel going into the world markets.”

That remark is a better guide to what the deal now does than the president’s original pitch, which was cheaper diesel for American drivers before the 3 November midterms. The reason is a four-year-old statute that the Treasury’s licence does not mention, and that can be lifted only by the outcome now being negotiated in Abu Dhabi.

What the licence says, and what the law says

On 9 October, the day Mr Trump announced the agreement after a call with Mr Putin, the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) issued General License 135. Its operative paragraph is short. It authorises, until 7 April 2027, all transactions prohibited under two sets of Russia sanctions regulations (31 CFR parts 587 and 589) “that are related to the sale, delivery, offloading, or importation, including importation into the United States, of diesel fuel of Russian Federation origin”. The only exception is any debit to US accounts of Russia’s central bank, National Wealth Fund or finance ministry.

The licence relaxes regulations. It does not refer to the Ending Importation of Russian Oil Act, which Congress passed in April 2022 by 414 votes to 17 in the House and 100 to 0 in the Senate. Section 2 of that act bans the import of all Russian products classified under chapter 27 of the US tariff schedule, the chapter that covers mineral fuels, oils and their distillates. Section 3 sets out the only way to end the ban. The president must consult four congressional committees and report to them at least 45 days in advance, then certify in writing that Russia has reached an agreement to withdraw its forces and cease hostilities “that is accepted by the free and independent government of Ukraine”, poses no immediate military threat to any NATO member, and recognises Ukrainians’ right to choose their own government. The ban lifts 90 days after that certification unless Congress enacts a joint resolution of disapproval.

No such certification has been made. Lawyers at Herbert Smith Freehills Kramer and Cleary Gottlieb have both noted that GL 135 does not address the statute, and that the new Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act, signed on 18 September, preserves the Treasury’s power to issue licences without amending the 2022 ban. The Treasury has said, according to media reports cited by Herbert Smith Freehills Kramer, that the licence is consistent with past agency practice and that it is complying with the law. On 11 October four Republican and three Democratic senators said in a joint statement that the policy runs directly counter to the 2022 law.

No court has ruled on the question. In practice it is being settled by people who could be exposed if the critics are right.

Who actually decides

Formal authority over sanctions sits with the president and the Treasury. Practical control over whether a cargo lands sits with terminal operators, shipowners, insurers and buyers, and with state officials who can make life difficult for them. On 27 October Senator Richard Blumenthal wrote to the owners of the Agioi Fanendes and a second tanker, the PVT Azura, arguing that GL 135 does not override the statute and that unloading would be an illegal transaction. On 2 November Mikie Sherrill, New Jersey’s governor, whose state contains the petroleum terminals of the Port of New York and New Jersey, wrote to port and terminal operators warning that offloading Russian diesel could expose them to civil and criminal penalties. She has called the arrangement “corrupt and illegal”.

A federal licence protects a company from Treasury enforcement under the regulations it covers. It cannot promise that a statute the licence does not mention will be read the same way by a future administration, a prosecutor or a court. That gap explains the behaviour of the ships. Greenpeace has identified five vessels it links to the deal, and says four turned south after rounding England, potentially towards Brazil. Shipping data cited by Al Jazeera and Bladi.net show the Russian-flagged Talisman entering the Mediterranean “for orders” and the Sierra Leone-flagged Leruo declaring Brazil. As of Tuesday, reporting by Reuters and Maritime Executive indicated that no cargo had been discharged in the United States.

Who benefits and who pays

The administration has a coherent economic argument. Diesel trades in a global market, and more Russian barrels anywhere can ease prices everywhere, including in the United States, where diesel prices have soared since the war with Iran began. That is the logic behind Mr Wright’s comment, and the licence is written to fit it: it is not limited to cargoes bound for American ports.

The volumes, however, are small relative to the US market. Mr Trump said Russia would make more than 300,000 tonnes, roughly 2.25m barrels, available immediately, followed by 500,000 tonnes in November and 1m tonnes after that. Maritime Executive puts US diesel consumption at about 120m barrels a month. The direct relief for American motorists was always marginal. The more substantial effect is that a US authorisation now covers the sale and delivery of Russian diesel to buyers elsewhere, under a US policy shift that Ukraine’s president, Volodymyr Zelensky, said in October would “put more money straight into Putin’s pocket to fund this war”.

Russia’s ability to cash in is limited by Ukraine. Kyiv resumed drone strikes on Russian refineries in late October, after rejecting an energy truce Mr Trump had announced. Reuters, citing industry sources, reported this week that attacks had disrupted nine of Russia’s 35 major refineries in a week and that plants with combined capacity of about 300,000 tonnes a day, against total primary capacity of about 930,000, had been hit since late October, cutting capacity by around 30%. S&P Global data show Russian diesel and gasoil loadings of 985,000 tonnes in October, against about 2.7m tonnes in November 2025, although loadings rose to 410,000 tonnes in the week to 5 November, with 141,000 tonnes declared for the United States. Mr Trump called the strikes “a disgrace” in October and has said Ukraine needs a new leader. The refinery campaign is the main lever Kyiv has over a deal it was not party to.

Where the diverted cargoes end up matters beyond the transatlantic quarrel. Turkey and Brazil were the largest buyers of Russian diesel before Moscow’s July export ban, according to Kpler. Among African states, Morocco stands out: Vortexa data published by OPIS, and reported by Bladi.net, show it imported 1.35m tonnes of Russian diesel and gasoil in the first half of 2026, 31% of its imports and more than from any other supplier. For such importers, cargoes that cannot land in America are extra supply. They are also supply from refineries under attack, traded under a US licence whose future is uncertain.

What happens next

Three dates matter. The first is the outcome of the US-brokered talks between Russia, Ukraine and the United States that began in Abu Dhabi on 10 November, the first such meeting since February. The 2022 statute ties a lawful end to the import ban to the outcome of those talks: a withdrawal and ceasefire agreement accepted by Kyiv. Even then, the act’s consultation and review periods mean an import ban could not lawfully lapse for at least 90 days after a certification.

The second is January, when the new Congress sits. Republicans lost control of both chambers in the midterms, and House members of both parties have already introduced bills, including the Prohibit Corrupt Russia Oil Deals Act (H.R. 10828), that would revoke GL 135 and restrict OFAC’s power to authorise Russian energy imports. A Democratic Congress can hold hearings and pass such a bill, but turning it into law would still need Mr Trump’s signature or a two-thirds majority in both chambers to override a veto.

The third is 7 April 2027, when GL 135 expires unless it is renewed. Until then, the likeliest outcome is the one Mr Wright described: Russian diesel moving under a US licence to ports outside the United States, while the only cargo that tested the American market has turned away from the US coast without discharging.

The episode shows the limits of sanctions policy made by licence. The president can relax regulations quickly. He cannot, on his own, remove a ban that Congress wrote and made conditional on peace. Until that condition is met, the deal is likely to benefit Russian sellers and foreign buyers far more than American drivers.